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seem to be colored byjthe Association's own propaganda. The Association's chief
activity was publishing a monthly journal. Following the announcement of Nanking's most.ambitious monopoly plan, the 1935.6-Year Plan.to Eliminate Opium,
the. Association dissolved itself rather than dishonor the cause .by collaboration
or futile resistance. The author's treatment of the role of opium in Chinese society
is also colored by the claims of anti-opium crusaders. Slack calls attention to the
fact that the Anti-Opium Association's archetypal emaciated and jaundiced addict was outnumbered by countless casual and recreational uses, implying a much
more complex relationship, between the Chinese people and opium. Throughout
the bulk of the book, however, this complexity fades into the background and all
opium smokers are. equated with addicts. These problems with locating opium in
its social context do not detract from the impressive success of .this book in shedding new light on the details of the opium, trade and the Guomindang's connection to it.
Indiana University of Pennsylvania

Alan Baumlef

Jordan, Donald A.: China's Trial by Fire: The Shanghai War of 1932. (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), xvii + 309 pp., $ 65.00. ISBN 9-47211165-5.
Barret,'David P. and Larry N. Shyu (eds.): Chinese Collaboration with Japan,
1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation. (Stanford: Stanford University Press,*
2001), xv + 290pp., $ 45.00. ISBN 0-8047-3768-1.
2001 was a. very good year for students of China's 20th century conflict, with
Japan; two books were published that do a great deal to advance our knowledge
of Chinese responses to the Japanese invasion. The first, Donald Jordan's history
of the Shangai War of 1932, is a carefully researched study of that short but
bloody conflict that draws upon a wide range of sources: Chinese, Japanese and
western.military, diplomatic and press reports, memoirs, and League of Nations
debates. Its purpose is to revise the tendency within American as well as Chinese
scholarship to'trivialize the 33-day battle that took place between Chinese ;and
Japanese forces in Shanghai from January to March 1932. In most prior accounts
this episode in China's struggle with foreign imperialism is treated as little more
than a.footnote; our memory of.it.is apt .to fade against the background of,the
Japanese conquest of Manchuria and the Sino-Japanese war of 1937-.1945. Jordan's survey of the field indicates that a few historians have recognized the great
significance of the war, but they have been unable to establish precisely why this
was so, their efforts being hampered by the. paucity of materials other than polemics and political propaganda. Other, historians.as recently as the 1990s have
clung to the habit of glossing over the 1932 war, minimizing both the scale of the
conflict and the Chinese resistance. What, we find in Jordan, however, is not only
that the Nanjing regime led a spirited campaign to resist a brutal Japanese attack,
but that'the Chinese military, notoriously divided by factional tensions, was able
to achieve a remarkable degree of coordination in the face of its common enemy.
J On the Japanese side, Jordan sheds considerable new light onto the Japanese
decision making ..process, revealing. that_ Japanese military leaders sianried. the
JAH 36/2 (2002)
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flames of and-Japanese activities in Shanghai partly in order to divert attention
from their efforts to consolidate the Kwantung Army's control of northern Manchuria. Meanwhile, the impact of what the Japanese at home called "the Shanghai
Incident" was profound: repercussions over what many people felt to be a premature and overly generous peace settlement were a factor in the political turbulence that brought an end to civilian rule.
The War also foreshadowed developments in modern war yet to come. A
crucial blow to the Chinese was delivered by Japanese units that outflanked Chinese lines, demonstrating the obsolescence of positional warfare 'in the face of a
highly mobile mechanized adversary - a lesson that Jordan suggests the German
army may have taken to heart as it prepared to maneuver around the Maginot
Line in 1940. Moreover, the record of Chinese guerrilla operations hints at the
role that guerrilla tactics would play in future East Asian wars, and international
revulsion at the behavior of Japanese forces signaled the end of what Jordan
calls "old-style imperialism" by placing the war in the context of an emerging
internationalism.
The war also had a significant impact upon the conflict between the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD). The CCP seized upon
Nanjing's acceptance of demilitarization in Shanghai for use as a weapon with
which to attack the legitimacy of the GMD. Thus, the CCP learned that manipulation of patriotism could be a useful political tactic, one that it still employs nearly
seventy years after the 1932 event.
In the light of Jordan's findings, it is no longer possible to treat the Shanghai
War as a minor episode in China's clash with Japanese imperialism. Nor can one
argue with confidence that the Nanjing regime lacked the resources and political
skills to mount a determined resistance campaign. Jordan's book has therefore
done much to illuminate this hitherto greatly misunderstood turning point in
China's 20th century history.
The second volume is an anthology containing eleven articles on Chinese collaboration with Japanese invaders from 1937-1945. In the concluding essay
Odoric-Wu summons scholars to utilize the many resources that have been made
available since Chinese scholarship was opened to the West'following the death
of Mao Zedong. The authors of these essays have made a very good start at
doing so. In general, they begin from the premise that conventional explanations
of collaboration are too simplistic since they tend to place the matter within a
framework that admits only two options, one patriotic (and therefore morally
correct) and the other an unprincipled betrayal'of the Chinese nation. Such
"moral binarism " to use Poshek Fu's term, tends to obscure the possibility that
collaborators may have acted from a complex mixture of motives. In his analysis
of collaboration narratives, Timothy Brook argues that they typically fail to describe the-actual practice of collaboration, and that a-more insightful approach
might be to recognize that collaboration is not necessarily the "exact opposite of
resistance." It could in fact be neutral, or even patriotic, and it could emerge
through a "dialogic process" involving a combination of tactics. In his exploration
of a hitherto neglected subject, the Reformed Government that Liang Hongzhi
led from 1938 to 1940, Brook argues that the regime was not merely a puppet (it
was, after all, unacceptable to many Japanese). Rather, it1 was the product of
JAH 36/2 (2002)
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negotiations by which Chinese factional interests themselves sought to maximize
their influence within the collaborationist regime in order to secure control over
various resources such as customs receipts, tax revenues, a national bank and
financial politiries. Similarly, Peter Seybolt's study of county-level politics confirms the impression that at a .variety of levels collaborators sought to take advantage of the conflict to advance, their goals in local struggles for power and influence. .Others found themselves trapped between the Japanese and their domestic
enemies. As Marjorie Dryburgh shows, conflict between regional power centers
and the Nationalist government gave Japanese militarists ample opportunity to
advance their position by playing the interests of one side against those of the
other. Incidentally, Dryburgh maintains .that it also put regional leaders in a position where they had no choice but to negotiate with the Japanese. Collaboration
was therefore inevitable, "not merely a matter of choosing resistance over appeasement."
None of the writers here found evidence to support the claim that Chinese
collaborators were attracted to the image of a Co-Prosperity Sphere with Japan
as its centerpiece and source of leadership. On the whole, they discovered instead
that collaboration tended to be pragmatic rather than ideological. There is also
support, however, for the notion that collaboration could, indeed, be a patriotic
act. Inevitably, much attention is directed at Wang Jingwei, whose leadership of
the collaborationist Nanjing goverment has marked him as a traitor in the eyes
of .several generations of Chinese. Revising this- interpretation, David Barre'tt
argues that in most respects Wang's.regime resembled the Nationalist Government of Jiang Jieshi: collaboration itself, was virtually the only issues that set
them apart. Wang Ke-wen adds that Wang's collaborationist posture was the
consequence of his lack of confidence in China's military. His actual policy was
to "resist while negotiating," seeking.to promote resistance in the hope that it
would, strenghten his hand in; negotiations, aimed at buying time for China to
.build military and economic strength.-Lo Jiu-jung appears to "agree in principle
but suggests that for many members of Wang's government the decision to collaborate was, after all, more for the sake of their political careers than for anything
else.
Lo adds an important dimension to the discussion by differentiating between
the motivations of different population groups: in the case of ordinary people
collaboration.was seldom a matter,of choice, for others it was often a decision
based on personal or family circumstances that could be political, economic or
social. Focusing on Chinese capitalists,* Parks Coble argues that while the Japanese need: for resources led them to allow some development by Chinese capital,
the structure-of political and • financial arrangements under the Co-Prosperity
Sphere left many Chinese businessmen with little room to grow and little to gain
by cooperating with the Japanese. Some, however, fared a great deal better. R.
^ Keith Schoppa shows, for example, that native banks, in Shaoxing County that
had been;suppressed by the GMD found'within the collaborationist .regime an
opportunity to thrive Aiter years during which Shaoxing suffered from GMD
misrule, the arrival of the Japanese brought stability and a welcome reprieve
'from political, economic and social instability. Under such circumstances, collaboration was an act~which combined^ personal self-interest with commitment to
rjJAH 36/2 (2002)
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collectivities other than the nation;(e.g., kinship, social"or business network, or
native place). Such "collectivities, as Lo Jiu-jung1'suggests,"could impose claims
upon aperson's loyalty, that were" at least as potent as nationalism.
As "one can see from the brief summary above, the revisionist scholarship
presented in each of these1 volumes opens many new windows onto the history
of one of the'most turbulent and important periodsrimmodem Chinese history.
'Jordan's work will probably stand for some time as the definitive account of what
will now come! to be'acknowledged as a crucial moment. Meanwhile/the collection by Barrett and Shyu will be regarded as a path breaking piece, one that does
a great deal to move the scholarly discussion of coUabor'ation in a new direction.
Both books demonstrate conclusively that there are;rich opportunities for new
research on pre-Communist China.
Sacred Heart University

Thomas D. Curran

Dryburgh, Marjorie: North China and Japanese Expansion, 1933-1937: Regional Power and the National Interest. (Richmond: Curzon, 2000). x + 249pp.,
£ 45.00. ISBN 0-7007-1274-7.
Following the consolidation of^'the Japaneseconquest of Manchuria ins 1933,
ambitious schemers in Japan's Guandohg' and North China Garrison armies lost
little" time in undertaking a series of initiatives to detach the provinces of North
China from the control of the government in Nanjing: The official Chinese response to these initiatives is commonly regarded.as confused and ineffectual Nanjing toying with appeasement and local authorities with collaboration -"until
mounting public outrage, coupled with the Xi'an Incident in 1937, forced a new
turn in policy.'Marjorie Dryburgh reexamines these events through the activities
of Song Zheyuan.ithe foremost military strongman '.in North China, and challenges the simplifying categories of appeasement, collaboration, and resistance
•often used to frame the politics of the Chinese response during this era.
' Central to Dryburgh's study is the dialectic of region and center. Given concerted Japanese attempts to divide and conquer, along with a history of "war'lordism" in North China, this relationship readily lends itself toxharacterization
as a conflict between a narrow regional interest, seduced by the promise of Japanese-guided autonomy, and a larger national interest represented by Nanjing. The
"author argues, however, that the problem may be better understood as a tension
between regional and central approaches to a common goal of securing the nation
as'a whole" against Japanese encroachment'. The'complex' trilateral negotiations
and intrigues involving Song Zheyuan, Japanese military representatives, and the
Nanjing government provide her with a vehicle to explore the conflict between
these two approaches
*" Dryburghacknowledges'that Song presented himself as an ambiguous figure
to his contemporaries as well as to latter-day historians. On the one* hand he
enjoyed solid credentials as a Chinese patriot* dedicated to the unity of China,
and as the result of a valiant effort as commander of the Twenty-Ninth Army in
the lighting in Rehe in 1933, was widely regarded as a hero in the cause of
resistance to Japan. He did not equate patriotism with allegiance to the Guornin'JAH 36/2 (2002)

